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ABSTRACT 
 
This study focuses on bankroll management, defined as the process of 
determining the right fraction of the bankroll one should put at risk in a 
particular advantageous situation, examined in a poker tournament context. 
The aim of the study is to conduct a theoretical analysis of bankroll 
management based on the Kelly criterion in a typical large poker tournament, 
using the actual World Series of Poker Main Event payout table as an 
example of such tournaments. A main conclusion of this paper is that a long-
term profitable poker player’s expected return on investment in tournaments 
(i.e., the level of advantage) does not provide sufficient information to obtain 
an optimal bankroll management policy for the player. The level of advantage 
is obviously an important factor, but the player’s strategic approach to the 
game, that is, if the player primarily tries to avoid finishing the tournament 
without a payout or if the player primarily tries to finish in the very top of the 
ranking, is also very important to consider. 
 
Keywords: Bankroll management; gambling; poker tournaments; Kelly 
criterion; poker strategy; game theory 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the beginning of the poker boom in 2003, when the amateur Chris 
Moneymaker won the World Series of Poker Main Event after winning his 
seat via a $39 satellite tournament, new players have regularly entered the 
poker scene, worked hard in order to master the fundamental underlying game 
theoretical concepts (e.g., Chen & Ankenman, 2006; Ferguson & Ferguson, 
2003; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), and risen to become stars of the 
game. As Levitt and Miles (2014) recently demonstrated, poker is a game that 
includes significant elements of skill besides the obvious element of luck, so 
even if the outcome of a poker game in the short term is determined by chance 
to a large extent, in the long run, poker players benefit from being good at the 
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game. However, being good at a game like poker is a concept with several 
meanings. 
The basis for most theoretical analyses of decision making in poker is the 
concept of expected value (EV). The idea is that if you make decisions that 
are on average profitable, you will show a profit in the long run when short-
term random variations have cancelled out (Chen & Ankenman, 2006; 
Sklansky, 1999). Many poker players, even among the best, seem to agree 
more or less without reflection with the EV criterion. A poker related decision 
with a positive EV should always be made, right? Wrong. A positive EV is 
necessary but not sufficient for a decision to be economically rational in a 
poker context. According to Browne (1989), a player needs to possess three 
rather different qualities in order to achieve long-term success in a skill-based 
gambling game. First, it is essential to have a strong knowledge of the 
mechanics of the game, which in poker is synonymous with the ability to 
make decisions with a positive EV at the table. Second, the ability to prevent 
emotions from negatively affecting play is obviously important in poker. Most 
of us interested in poker have seen otherwise good players go on tilt after a 
bad beat and lose even more money. Third, and this is the focus of this paper, 
is bankroll management: the ability to determine the right fraction of the 
bankroll to put at risk in a particular advantageous situation. Risking too small 
a fraction means giving up some of the EV, but risking too large a fraction 
means an increased risk of ruin. Hence, bankroll management in its purest 
form is a question of balance. 
While tactical decisions at the poker tournament table (i.e., the decision to 
check, bet, fold, call, or raise while playing a single hand) should be made in 
terms of maximizing the EV, strategic decisions (i.e., the decision to buy in to 
the tournament in the first place) must be made with respect to proper 
bankroll management.1 A tournament with a positive EV may very well 
constitute a negative expected growth rate (EGR) of the bankroll, in which 
case the player should not buy in. For example, assume that your current 
bankroll is $1,000,000 and you are being offered to buy in for $100,000 at a 
winner-takes-all poker tournament with 50 other players. You know that the 
other players on average are relatively bad, so you expect to win on average 1 
out of 25 such tournaments. Should you accept the offer? It is easy to see that 
your EV is positive [ )04.01(000,10050*04.0*000,100 −−  = $104,000], 
so you will on average make money by participating in this tournament. 
However, since the game will either sextuple your bankroll with a probability 
of 0.04 or otherwise reduce it to 90% of its previous level, the EGR of the 
bankroll is negative [ )9.0log()04.01()6log(04.0 −+  = –0.0128]. Hence, 
                                                     
1 In a cash game, where the chips have monetary value, the size of the bankroll is also 
affected by the tactical decisions, since players have the option to leave the table with 
their current stack of chips after any hand. Hence, bankroll management should, at 
least in theory, be part of every decision making process in such games. 
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the correct strategic decision is to decline the offer to participate in the 
tournament, despite the positive EV. 
The apparent inconsistency depends on the fact that the variability in the 
EV of the game is very high. Even though the EV of tournament participation 
in the example above was substantial—more than one buy-in—the standard 
deviation is actually close to ten buy-ins. Therefore, you lose too much too 
often when you do not win the tournament in relation to the amount you gain 
when you actually do win it, resulting in a negative EGR of the bankroll 
despite the positive EV of the game itself. 
A typical large-scale multi-table poker tournament pays out a substantial 
part of the prize pool to the top finishers, especially to the winner. For 
example, the official World Series of Poker Main Event 2014 Payout table 
shows that with 6,481 entrants, the first prize would be 1,000 buy-ins, second 
price would be 505 buy-ins, and third prize would be 361 buy-ins. In such a 
high-variance event, a positive EV is not enough to make it rational for a 
player to buy in at $10,000 to play if that $10,000 constitutes a relatively large 
fraction of the player’s bankroll. 
There seem to be only a few previous empirical studies on issues 
specifically related to the bankroll management of poker players. Palomäki et 
al. (2014) and Palomäki et al. (2013) relate “tilting” (i.e., when emotions 
affect play negatively) to “loss chasing” (i.e., a decision to play at higher 
stakes than normal without bankroll management consideration, with the hope 
of winning back money that was previous lost). Their evidence suggests, 
among other things, that experienced players are less likely to tilt in relative 
terms per single hand, but more likely to tilt in the long run. Griffiths et al. 
(2010) found that bankroll management was one out of several factors that 
could predict financial success of an online poker player. Hopely and Nicki 
(2010) found that problem gambling (including bad bankroll management) 
among poker players was uniquely predicted by time played, dissociation, 
boredom proneness, impulsivity, and negative affective states like depression, 
anxiety, and stress. Neither of the above studies used random samples of 
poker players, however, so the practical value in terms of generalizability of 
these results is somewhat limited. 
The aim of this study is to conduct a theoretical analysis of bankroll 
management in a typical large poker tournament, using the actual World 
Series of Poker Main Event 2014 payout table as a case example. The purpose 
is to investigate how different categories of players with a similar EV will 
differ in terms of how they should manage their bankroll in such a 
tournament, and to examine how the required bankroll for a certain player 
category varies with the EV. The remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows. In the next section, the Kelly criterion for optimizing the EGR of the 
bankroll is sketched briefly. Then, the World Series of Poker Main Event 
2014 tournament structure is outlined. Thereafter, the bankroll management 
analyses are presented. The conclusions of these analyses and some directions 
for further research are given in the final section. 
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2 THE KELLY CRITERION 
 
Assume that a player will win a two-outcome game with probability p, 
that the odds of the game are b to 1 (i.e., the player’s bankroll will increase by 
b units if he or she wins and decrease by 1 unit otherwise), and that the EV of 
the game is positive (i.e., 1)1( >+bp ). If x is the fraction of the bankroll the 
player bets, the EGR g(x) of the bankroll is 
 
(1) )1log()1log()1()( bxpxpxg ++−−= . 
 
The optimal EGR of the bankroll is given by 
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which is the classical formula attributed to Kelly (1956). By betting this 
fraction (the Kelly bet), the EGR is maximized. Hence, betting more increases 
risk (in terms of bankroll variability) while decreasing the EGR, so such a 
strategy is dominated by the Kelly bet. Betting less also decreases the EGR 
but since it is less risky, such strategies may be rational for more conservative 
players to adopt. Betting less than nothing (i.e., taking the other side of the 
bet) or betting more than double the Kelly bet makes the EGR negative 
(Poundstone, 2010). 
More generally, assume that the game has m outcomes and that the profit 
for a unit wager for outcome i is ib  with the probability ip , where at least one 
outcome is negative and at least one is positive. If x is the fraction of the 
bankroll the player bets, the EGR g(x) of the bankroll becomes 
 
(4) )1(log)(
1
xbpxg i
m
i
i += ∑
=
.        
 
Hence,  
 
(5) 0
1
)(
1
=
+
= ∑
=
m
i i
ii
xb
pb
dx
xdg
 
 
BANKROLL MANAGEMENT IN LARGE POKER TOURNAMENTS 
 
 
7 
gives the maximum EGR of the bankroll, where the relevant solution is the 
smallest positive root. This is the general Kelly criterion for games with many 
outcomes (see e.g., Barnett, 2011 for a formal derivation). 
 
3 WORLD SERIES OF POKER MAIN EVENT 
 
The World Series of Poker (WSOP) is the largest and most well-known 
poker event in the world. It takes place every summer in Las Vegas and 
consists of many individual tournaments (in 2014 there were 65 different 
tournaments) of which the Main Event (ME) historically has been the largest 
in terms of the number of players as well as in terms of the prize pool. The 
entrance fee for the ME is $10,000 per player, where $9,400 goes back to the 
player collective through the prize pool and the remaining $600 is kept as rake 
by the host casino and organizers. There are no specific qualification 
requirements (except that players must be 21 years or older), so anyone who 
pays $10,000 can participate in this event and play against some of the best 
and most well-known poker players in the world. There are also many satellite 
tournaments online as well as live games where players can win a seat in the 
WSOP ME at a lower cost, as Chris Moneymaker did in 2003 when he 
eventually won the entire event. 
As in almost all large poker tournaments, roughly the top 10% of the 
players in the WSOP ME finish “in-the-money” (ITM) and receive payouts, 
while the remaining players receive nothing. Table 1 shows an excerpt from 
the WSOP ME 2014 Payout table for 6,481 entrants, illustrating that even if 
players finishing at 666th place or better all do receive money, the top 3 
finishers collectively receive over 30% of the price pool. Hence, as large 
poker tournaments typically do, the WSOP ME distributes the money in the 
prize pool in a very skewed way among the participants, thus creating a huge 
variance in the players’ EVs. For most amateur players participating in such 
events, the variance is primarily seen as a positive factor as it means that they 
actually have a chance to win a lot of money if they get lucky, despite their 
(typically) negative EVs. For the professionals, on the other hand, the huge 
variance is a double edged sword, as it means that more often than not they 
will leave the tournament with no payout; but also that more amateurs, whose 
presence (typically) increases the professionals’ EV, are attracted to it. 
 
4 BANKROLL MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS 
 
Assume that an average player in the field is equally likely to finish at any 
place. Then, there are two conceptual ways to have an advantage against an 
average player in a large poker tournament. First, one can have a higher 
probability to finish ITM than the average player. Second, one can have a 
weighted probability distribution for the different ITM places that favors the 
highest payouts. The first distinct type of player makes money in the long run 
by finishing ITM more often than the average player, but with a uniform 
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probability distribution for the different ITM places. The second distinct type 
makes money in the long run by receiving a larger average payout than the 
average player when he or she does finish ITM, but with the same probability 
to actually finish ITM as the average player. The theoretical analyses below 
are based on those two archetypes. In practice, most long-term profitable 
poker tournament players are probably characterized by both these tendencies, 
but with varying weights.  
 
Table 1: Excerpt from the WSOP ME 2014 Payout table for 6,481 entrants2 
 
Payout level Place Payout (USD) 
1 1 10,000,000 
2 2 5,047,370 
3 3 3,617,693 
4 4 2,712,211 
5 5 2,046,886 
6 6 1,555,305 
7 7 1,189,436 
8 8 915,478 
9 9 708,528 
10 10-12 551,388 
11 13-15 431,606 
12 16-18 339,694 
13 19-27 281,666 
14 28-36 226,519 
15 37-45 183,231 
16 46-54 149,431 
17 55-63 122,747 
18 64-72 101,400 
19 73-81 84,203 
20 82-90 70,565 
21 91-99 59,298 
22 100-162 50,403 
23 163-234 42,695 
24 235-306 36,765 
25 307-378 31,428 
26 379-450 27,277 
27 451-522 23,719 
28 523-594 20,754 
29 595-666 18,382 
No payout 667-6481 0 
 
 
                                                     
2 The actual number of entrants in the WSOP ME 2014 was 6,683, so 6,481 is the 
next lower number of entrants to be found in the fictitious payout table published in 
advance by the event organizers. 
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Equation (5) was used to obtain the optimal bankroll size in terms of the 
number of buy-ins (i.e., the inverse of the optimal fraction of the bankroll to 
bet) for a number of different levels of advantage, where the type of 
advantage is an increased probability to finish ITM compared with the 
average player. Similarly, equation (4) was used to derive the critical bankroll 
size, that is, the smallest possible number of buy-ins the player can have in the 
bankroll before the EGR becomes negative despite the positive EV, for the 
same different levels and type of advantage. The results of these calculations 
are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Optimal and critical bankroll sizes for a player with an increased ITM 
probability 
 
Increased 
probability to 
finish ITM 
$EV Expected 
return on 
investment 
Optimal 
bankroll 
size 
Critical 
bankroll 
size 
10% 340 3.4% 7143 3448 
20% 1280 12.8% 1587 714 
30% 2220 22.2% 763 324 
40% 3160 31.6% 446 181 
50% 4100 41.0% 287 112 
60% 5040 50.4% 196 75 
70% 5980 59.8% 139 52 
80% 6920 69.2% 102 38 
90% 7860 78.6% 77 29 
100% 8800 88.0% 60 22 
120% 10,680 106.8% 38 14 
150% 13,500 135.0% 22 9 
200% 18,200 182.0% 12 5 
 
As one would expect, the size of both the optimal and the critical bankroll 
decreases rather rapidly with an increased advantage. The fact that the EGR 
will be positive for players with large bankrolls, as long as the advantage 
outweighs the rake, is of course trivial, but the lower limit of the bankroll size 
before the EGR becomes negative is rather high unless the player’s advantage 
is large. There is a huge difference in required bankroll size between a player 
with a small advantage and a player with a large advantage. 
Equations (4) and (5) were also used to obtain the optimal bankroll size 
and the critical bankroll size when the type of advantage is a weighted 
probability distribution for the different ITM places that favors the highest 
payouts. Because there are 29 different payout levels (see Table 1), the 
probability to finish at payout level 1 (i.e., to win the tournament) is increased 
by a factor Z while the probability to finish at payout level 29 is reduced by 
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the same absolute amount, the probability to finish at payout level 2 (i.e., to 
finish as runner-up) is increased by the factor Z*(13/14) while the probability 
to finish at payout level 28 is reduced by the same absolute amount, and so 
on. Hence, the probability distribution of the 29 payout levels is “tilted” 
linearly with payout level 15 as midpoint and the total probability to finish 
ITM is thus constant irrespective of the value of Z. A higher value of Z 
obviously corresponds to a more apparent “tilt” of the probability distribution, 
and, hence, a higher $EV. Different values of Z were used to obtain the same 
$EV levels as in Table 2 in order to make direct comparisons possible. The 
resulting optimal and critical bankroll sizes are displayed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Optimal and critical bankroll sizes for a player with a “tilted” payout 
level probability distribution 
 
The weighting 
factor Z 
$EV Expected 
return on 
investment 
Optimal 
bankroll size 
Critical 
bankroll 
size 
0.2427 340 3.4% 8130 3937 
0.4855 1280 12.8% 2041 935 
0.7282 2220 22.2% 1136 498 
0.9709 3160 31.6% 781 327 
1.2137 4100 41.0% 588 239 
1.4564 5040 50.4% 469 187 
1.6992 5980 59.8% 389 152 
1.9419 6920 69.2% 331 127 
2.1846 7860 78.6% 289 107 
2.4274 8800 88.0% 256 95 
2.9128 10,680 106.8% 207 75 
3.6410 13,500 135.0% 162 57 
4.8547 18,200 182.0% 119 40 
 
Here, too, the sizes of both the optimal and the critical bankroll decrease 
with an increased advantage; and there is a large difference in required 
bankroll size between a player with a small advantage and a player with a 
large advantage. The main differences, however, are that when the type of 
advantage is a weighted probability distribution for the different ITM places 
that favors the highest payouts, the decrease in the sizes of the optimal and 
critical bankroll for increasing $EV is markedly slower, and the optimal as 
well as critical bankroll sizes are larger for all $EV levels, especially so for 
the most profitable players. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
 
Bankroll management can be seen as the process of determining the right 
fraction of their bankroll that players should put at risk in a particular 
advantageous situation. A fundamental bankroll management problem in the 
poker tournament context is that a large high stakes tournament such as the 
WSOP ME may, due to the high variance in the EV, represent a negative EGR 
of the player’s bankroll, even though the EV of participation in the 
tournament itself is substantially positive. In order to avoid this problem, one 
simply cannot play at too high stakes. On the other hand, when playing at too 
small stakes, the EGR of the bankroll may be negligible in relation to the 
potential. Balancing these two forces is the actual core of bankroll 
management in any type of advantageous game. 
A main conclusion of this paper is that a long-term profitable poker 
player’s expected return on investment in tournaments (i.e., the level of 
advantage) does not provide sufficient information to obtain an optimal 
bankroll management policy for the player. The level of advantage is 
obviously an important factor, but the player’s strategic approach to the game, 
that is, if the player primarily tries to avoid finishing the tournament without a 
payout (the low risk approach) or if the player primarily tries to finish in the 
very top of the ranking (the high risk approach), is also very important to 
consider. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that a WSOP ME player with a 
low risk approach and an expected return on investment of around 40% has 
about the same optimal bankroll size as a WSOP ME player with a high risk 
approach and an expected return on investment of around 80%. Hence, there 
is definitely no bankroll size that, even as a rule of thumb, can be said to be 
about right for most tournament poker players. The players’ skill levels and 
their strategic approach to the game must both be considered in their bankroll 
management process. 
Although all long-term profitable tournament poker players are well 
aware of their strategic approach to the game, the skill level of a player is 
difficult to determine with some precision. How can you reasonably know 
what your expected return on investment is in a particular tournament? To 
avoid the hubris factor, many professionals seem to derive estimates of their 
advantage from previous results; that is, they use their actual average return 
on investment in a large number of similar tournaments as an estimate of their 
expected return on investment in a particular tournament. While such an 
approach is questionable in terms of both validity and reliability for the 
individual player, it seems reasonable to assume that the best poker players 
may have an expected return on investment of perhaps 25% in tournaments in 
general, even though in the WSOP Main Event specifically it could very well 
be much higher, because the proportion of amateurs playing that event is very 
high in relation to the stakes (Pempus, 2014; Plant, 2014). As the results in 
this paper have shown, efficient bankroll management in poker tournaments 
depends fundamentally on reliable estimates of the players’ actual advantages 
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against the field in the tournaments they consider entering. This highlights the 
need for sensitivity analyses in the bankroll management process, because it is 
dangerous for players with a small bankroll to overvalue their $EV. The 
difference in assumed and actual skill level that makes an optimal EGR 
become a negative EGR is not that large. When in doubt, the safe way is 
simply to play at lower rather than at higher stakes, because the EGR can by 
definition never become negative with a bankroll larger than the optimal one, 
as long as the EV is positive. 
As the results in this paper show, a player with an expected return on 
investment of around 25% needs a bankroll size somewhere between 500 and 
1,000 buy-ins to be able to play a tournament of the WSOP ME size and 
structure efficiently. Playing with a smaller bankroll means higher variability 
in the bankroll in combination with a lower EGR, something that cannot be 
rational in a risk-reward perspective. Playing with a larger bankroll, on the 
other hand, may be rational for some players because the lower risk can 
compensate for the lower EGR. Although professional poker players typically 
do not share detailed information regarding the size of their bankrolls 
publicly, it seems safe to assume that it is much more common that players 
play at too high stakes than at too low stakes from a bankroll management 
perspective. 
There are several directions for future research in this field. First, from a 
theoretical perspective, the classical observation that the EGR becomes 
negative when the player bets more than double the Kelly bet evidently does 
not apply in games with many outcomes. Where the verge is seems to depend 
on the structure and probability distribution of the outcomes in the specific 
game, but in a poker tournament of the WSOP ME type, it fluctuates between 
double and triple the Kelly bet. Second, from an empirical perspective, we 
need to increase our understanding of how professional poker players (and 
other gamblers) manage their bankrolls. From a quantitative perspective, the 
amount of scientific and other literature on the mechanics of poker seems to 
overshadow the amount of literature on the other two qualities needed for 
success, that is, the ability to prevent emotions from negatively affecting play 
and the ability to manage bankrolls properly. This can be seen as an indication 
that the potential for improvement for the average ambitious professional 
player lies mainly with these two qualities. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that a limitation of the analysis in this 
study is the assumption that players only play to win money and do not assign 
value to other things. In practice, of course, a win in a WSOP event is in itself 
very prestigious, especially among the most celebrated professionals who 
probably look at each other’s bracelets3 with a combination of admiration and 
envy. Only a few days before these very lines were written, Phil Helmuth, one 
                                                     
3 A bracelet is awarded to the winner of every event in the WSOP, in addition to the 
prize money. Such bracelets are among the most coveted non-monetary prizes poker 
players can win. 
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of the most successful poker players of all time, won his fourteenth WSOP 
event. Although the monetary payout for the win of course was considerable, 
Helmuth seemed to value the win as such as substantially higher than the 
prize money. 
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